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Abstract 
 The paper investigates the effects of fiscal policy on the time-varying business cycle 
synchronisation between the EMU12 member-countries and the aggregate EMU12-wide 
business cycle. The impact of fiscal policy on the level of synchronisation is estimated from 
the difference between the time-varying correlation of each country's business cycle and the 
aggregate EMU12 business cycle, before and after the effects of fiscal policy on the business 
cycle are accounted for. The findings suggest that fiscal policy has important effects on 
business cycle synchronisation for all EMU12 countries. Hence, fiscal policy is shown to have 
the potential to be supportive of macroeconomic stabilisation in the Eurozone. However the 
evidence reveals that none of the countries under examination consistently use fiscal policy to 
promote business cycle synchronisation. 
 
Keywords: Time varying correlation, EMU business cycle, business cycle synchronisation, 
fiscal policy, Diag-BEKK model. 
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1. Introduction 
 Since the launch of the Euro currency in 1999, European Monetary Union (EMU) has 
had a short but turbulent history. The knock on effects of the 2007 Economic and Financial 
Crisis has led to an existential crisis for the Eurozone. The root cause of the current difficulties 
for the Euro currency zone lies in the inherent contradiction between a single, supra-national 
currency and the maintenance of nation based fiscal policies and financial regulation (see, 
Lane, 2012 and Shambaugh, 2012 for a review).   
 Underlying the architecture of EMU, or any single currency area, is the important role 
of business cycle synchronization. Business cycle synchronisation refers to the level of co-
movement of the boom-bust economic phases of the member-countries over time. It must be 
emphasised that business cycle synchronisation does not be necessarily mean convergence in 
economic growth rates (see, Degiannakis et al., 2014). Convergence refers to the catch-up 
effect among countries’ growth rates, as opposed to synchronisation which refers to the co-
movements of the countries’ growth rates (Crowley and Schultz, 2010).  
 The importance of business cycle synchronisation for the operation of a common 
currency area is referred in the seminal works on Optimum Currency Area theory (OCA) by 
Kennen (1969), McKinnon (1963), and Mundell (1961), as well as, more recent contributions 
by Furceri and Karras (2008) and Alesina and Barro (2002).	   Indeed, business cycle 
synchronisation is regarded as a pre-requisite for the effective functioning of a monetary union 
(Alesina and Barro, 2002), and the very survival of a monetary union depends on the 
commonality of business cycle fluctuations (see Bergman, 2006). Business cycle 
synchronisation ensures that supra-national, “one size fits all”, monetary policies are 
appropriate in the individual national economies and thus the union-wide monetary policy can 
effectively substitute the national monetary policies. Nevertheless, if business cycles are not 
synchronised, national fiscal policies take on an additional importance as a tool for 
macroeconomic stabilisation policy.  
 To elaborate further, we argue that in a monetary union with synchronised business 
cycles among its member-countries, the common monetary policy can be effectively used as a 
tool for macroeconomic stabilisation. However, when a country is impacted by an asymmetric 
shock (thus its cycle becomes de-synchronised with the union-wide business cycle), or 
impacted asymmetrically by a common economic shock (once again this will lead to a de-
synchronisation of its business cycle with the union-wide cycle), the independent fiscal policy 
can be used as a macroeconomic stabilisation tool. As such national fiscal policies in the 
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Eurozone take on an additional role in promoting the cyclical synchronisation of Eurozone 
economies with the aggregate Euro-wide business cycle.  
Hence, understanding the effects of fiscal policy and the role it has played in 
determining business cycle synchronisation in the Eurozone is a pertinent and timely research 
question. As the architecture of EMU continues to evolve following the Global Financial Crisis 
of 2007-09 and the subsequent Eurozone debt crisis, an understanding how fiscal policy 
impacts business cycle synchronisation is of a major importance in this area of research. Thus, 
the paper examines the effects of fiscal policy on the time-varying business cycle 
synchronisation between the initial EMU12 member-countries and the EMU12-wide business 
cycle.  
In short, the evidence suggest that fiscal policy exercises a significant effect of business 
cycle synchronisation across all EMU12 member-countries, although not of the same 
magnitude. In addition, this effect is both time-varying and country specific. Interestingly, we 
cannot claim that fiscal policy effects on business cycle synchronisation are different either in 
the pre or the post EMU period or between the core and peripheral EMU countries. Prominent 
among our results is that despite the fact that fiscal policy could increase business cycle 
synchronisation; there is no evidence that it has consistently been used in such a way.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature, Section 3 
describes the research question to be investigated, whereas, Sections 4 and 5 present the data 
and the Diag-BEKK model framework, respectively. Section 6 outlines the descriptive findings 
of the research and Section 7 analyses the time-varying effects of fiscal policy on business 
cycle synchronisation. Finally, Section 8 concludes the study along with the policy 
implications. 
 
2. Fiscal policy and business cycles 
 As aforementioned, the degree of business cycle synchronisation has an impact on the 
effectiveness of policies set by the central bank of a monetary union. In the case of synchronous 
cycles among the economies that compose a monetary union, the central bank can impose 
stabilisation policies with greater ease (see, for example, Clarida et al., 1999; Rogoff, 1985). 
In the event that individual economies face asymmetric shocks, or react asymmetrically to 
symmetric shocks, fiscal authorities ought to use their fiscal policy to counterbalance the 
negative impacts of the common monetary policy (Crowley and Schultz, 2010). As Lane (2006) 
suggests for the EMU, ‘with a common monetary policy, national fiscal policies become the 
major tool by which governments can dampen fluctuations in output’ (p.61). Fatas and Mihov 
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(2009) also emphasise the fact that EMU member-countries should use their fiscal policy more 
actively in the monetary union in order to smooth their business cycles, since individual 
monetary policies are absent.  
Applying fiscal policy to dampen fluctuations in output in a monetary union will 
involve reacting to asymmetric shocks, as well as, reacting to symmetric shocks with 
asymmetric impacts.  The ability of any country’s economy to react to either shock, without 
fiscal policy intervention, will differ due to differing structural factors across countries, such 
as the degree of wage and price flexibility and the degree of labour mobility across countries. 
Such structural differences promote the need for and use of fiscal policy (Van Aarle and 
Garretsen, 2000). Along a similar vein, Bearce (2009) suggests that fiscal policy divergence 
within EMU may be necessary when macroeconomic convergence has not being achieved.  
Hence the expanded role for fiscal policy, as a result of EMU membership, will differ across 
countries depending on the individual economic structures of the national economy. 
An additional implication for the impact of fiscal policy on business cycle 
synchronisation is related to the objectives for which national fiscal policies are used. A 
political economy approach to fiscal policy emphasises that policy makers may not to use fiscal 
policy in a countercyclical fashion, instead the outcome will may be a deficit bias (Alesina and 
Tabellini, 1990; Persson and Svensson, 1989), procyclical fiscal policy (Lane 2003) or even a 
business cycle driven by fiscal policy shocks (Fatas and Mihov, 2007; Drazen, 2000). Thus, 
whether fiscal policy is applied in a countercyclical, procyclical or acyclical manner and its 
impact on business cycle synchronisation is an empirical question.  
Nevertheless, despite the increased importance of the role of fiscal policy in a monetary 
union, the institutions of EMU have limited the approved role of fiscal policy in reacting to 
shocks through the Maastricht Treaty, The Stability and Growth Pact and more recently 
through the Fiscal Compact. Fatas and Mihov (2009) provide a useful review of the literature 
on the behaviour of fiscal policy in the EMU, reporting that fiscal policy is mildly procyclical.  
Furthermore, evidence from Gali and Perotti (2003) finds that the fiscal constraints 
imposed in the Eurozone have been supportive of countercyclical fiscal policy. Fiscal policy is 
shown to change from being procyclical to countercyclical in the post Maastricht period. They 
opine that the Maastricht Treaty as such encouraged discretionary fiscal policies to become 
more countercyclical over time in the Eurozone. This occurs because fiscal policy is 
constrained thus reducing policy induced fluctuations, allowing automatic stabilisers to take a 
more important role. However, Fatas and Mihov (2009) have not found any change in fiscal 
	  5	  
	  
policy as a result of the Maastricht constraints or the adoption of the single currency, i.e. it 
remains mildly procyclical.  
However, Candelon et al. (2010) did find an increase in the procyclical behaviour of 
fiscal policy during the post Maastricht period. They interpret this as evidence of the constraints 
tying the hands of fiscal policy makers. Thus, Bearce (2009) argues that greater flexibility is 
required under the Stability and Growth Pact in order for the EMU member-countries to 
achieve greater macroeconomic synchronisation. Furceri (2009) and Fatas and Mihov (2003, 
2006), on the other hand, suggest that unconstrained idiosyncratic fiscal policy is often a source 
of macroeconomic destabilisation and increased business cycle volatility, which in turn leads 
to the reduced synchronisation between business cycles. Thus, fiscal policy constraints could 
be useful in avoiding such destabilisation.  
The estimation, in this study, of a time varying measure of business cycle 
synchronisation, and the impact of fiscal policy on that level of synchronisation, will provide 
evidence on whether or not there has been a discernible change in the impact of fiscal policy 
on business cycle synchronisation in the Eurozone. 
There are two main channels via which fiscal policy can impact business cycle 
synchronisation. Fiscal policy will impact on a country’s business cycle synchronisation with 
the aggregate EMU12-wide cycle directly through its impact on the domestic economy or 
indirectly through spillover effects.  
The impact of fiscal policy on the domestic economy has been a divisive issue among 
economists for some time, and the controversy has only increased since the Global Financial 
Crisis of 2007-09.  Keynesian economists argue that in a case of a negative aggregate demand 
shock, a fiscal stimulus will have an expansionary effect on the economy (see, Krugman, 2012, 
for example), while, on the contrary, those who are influenced by the seminal work of Giavazzi 
and Pagano (1990) argue that a fiscal contraction is more appropriate in order to have 
expansionary effects in the economy. Indeed, recently Alesina and Ardagna (2010, p. 35) have 
remarked that we still know “… relatively little about the effect of fiscal policy…”. 
An individual EMU country’s fiscal policy may also have spillover effects on other 
member countries and thus can affect business cycle synchronization (Corsetti et al., 2010). 
We maintain that EMU countries are interconnected not only through their currency but also 
through trade linkages. Thus, fiscal policy decisions in any one country are likely to have 
spillover effects into other countries, which are transmitted directly or indirectly via trade 
linkages. As such, a fiscal stimulus in one member-country could result in public spending 
falling directly on trading partners’ exports. Additionally, fiscal stimulus which expands 
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economic activity in the home country may indirectly increase trading partners’ exports. In any 
case, exports of a member-country could increase due to a fiscal stimulus in another member-
country. The reverse of course holds true in the case of a fiscal contraction. Beetsma et al. 
(2006) and Giuliodori and Beetsma (2004) provide evidence of the importance of fiscal policy 
spillovers in Europe.  
Furthermore, any spillover effects would be expected to be greater for the larger 
countries due to the scale of the impact of a large countries fiscal policy. For example, given 
that Germany’s GDP is almost 30% of EMU GDP, we could expect to observe greater potential 
spillover effects. Thus, it could be expected that the fiscal policies of larger countries could 
have sizeable effects on the smaller countries’ business cycles. Considering though that this is 
the first study to examine the time-varying effects of fiscal policy on business cycle 
synchronisation, we do not separate these possible spillover effects of fiscal policy but rather 
we leave it for further study. At this study we solely focus on the overall effect of fiscal policy 
on business cycle synchronisation. Thus, we leave the investigation of spillover effects for 
further study.  
 Overall, the focus on the effects of fiscal policy on business cycle synchronisation is 
still rather limited in the literature. Studies such as Inklaar et al. (2008), as well as, Bower and 
Guillemineau (2006) indicate that greater fiscal policy convergence contributes weakly to 
increased business cycle synchronisation. Rather, the literature mainly concentrates its 
attention on other determinants of business cycle synchronisation such as, trade intensity, 
financial integration, industrial specialisation, similarity in industrial structure, factor 
endowments, distance between countries, language, adjacency, political ideology and global 
economic shocks (see, Cerqueira and Martins, 2011; Kose et al., 2008; de Haan et al., 2008; 
Calderon et al., 2007; Kose and Yi, 2006; Imbs, 2004, 2006; Morgan et al., 2004; Kose et al., 
2003a, 2003b; Frankel and Rose, 1998; Canova and Dellas, 1993). 
The present study adds to the limited literature on the impact of fiscal policy on business 
cycle synchronisation. We do not consider, though, the fiscal policy convergence among the 
EMU member-countries, but we examine the effect of an individual countries’ fiscal policy on 
the level of business cycle synchronisation between that country’s and the aggregate EMU12-
wide business cycles. This approach directly examines how and if an individual country’s fiscal 
policy promotes business cycle synchronisation. Furthermore, studies so far do not allow for a 
time-varying impact of fiscal policy on business cycle synchronisation. This study is the first 
to utilise a time-varying framework to examine the effects of fiscal policy on business cycle 
synchronisation. The effects are examined in such a framework to allow for variation over time 
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associated with changing EU institutions and variations in domestic fiscal priorities associated 
with national priorities. 
This paper provides evidence of the impact of fiscal policy on business cycle 
synchronisation. The impact of fiscal policy on business cycle synchronisation is country-
specific and is not constant across time. Moreover, none of the countries examined consistently 
use fiscal policy to promote business cycle synchronisation. 
 
3. Dynamic Correlation between Business Cycles and Fiscal Policy 
An optimum currency area is enhanced when policy promotes synchronisation between 
nation business cycles and the aggregate monetary union-wide cycle. If we denote the business 
cycle of country i , at time t , as tic , , and the union wide cycle as tMUc , , then the relationship 
between the two cycles is expressed as: 
tititMU cc ,,, φ= , (1) 
  and each country’s target is 1, →tiφ , where ti ,φ  denotes the level of synchronisation.  
We claim that each country’s business cycle fluctuations are related to certain economic 
variables, kti −,Ω , as well as, to the fiscal policy, ktix −, , such as that: 
( )ktiktiti xfc −−= ,,, ;Ω 1. (2) 
The kti −,Ω  and  ktix −,  are defined at time kt −  for nk ,...,1,0= , to focus on the reaction of the 
business cycle to economic condition2. The business cycle’s fluctuations which are not related 
to the fiscal policy are denoted as: 
( )nkxgcc ktititi ,...,1,0;,,*, =−= − , (3) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	   ( ).f  represents a function - linear or non-linear – of kti −,Ω  and ktix −, ; ktiktix −− ⊂ ,, Ω . 
2	  As we focus on how the business cycle reacts to fiscal policy and not the effects of the business cycle on the 
deficit, a lagged relationship of ( )ktiti xfc −= ,,  could be considered; previous year’s fiscal policy changes could 
matter to currents year’s synchronisation. However, this approach would underestimate the impact of the fiscal 
policy in very flexible economies where the economic reactions to fiscal shocks are short lived; ( )titi xfc ,, = . 
According to Mertens and Ravn (2012) and Blanchard and Perotti (2002) for the US case, and Giuliodori and 
Beetsma (2009) for Europe, the fiscal policy has non-negligible effects in the very short term, and they can die 
out very fast. Additionally, the political environment in any specific member state likely will determine the 
distribution of the fiscal stimulus impact to aggregate demand over a longer than one year horizon. More open 
governments will tend to front load most of the impact to the first year, or even before that if households have 
rational expectations, whereas governments that tend to have surprising changes in fiscal policy, perhaps because 
of a more opaque political process or because of changing coalition partner demands, will likely have a greater 
weight on the second year impact. In order to incorporate such aspects in the analysis, we assume a multiple-years 
relationship between fiscal policy and business cycles, i.e. ( )ktiktiti xfc −−= ,,, ;Ω , for nk ...,2,1,0= . 
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where ( ).g  denotes a function (linear or non-linear) of fiscal policy at time kt − . Hence, the 
level of business cycle synchronisation between country i  and the monetary union, having 
disentangled country’s i  fiscal policy effect, can be defined as: 
*
,
*
,, tititMU cc φ= . (4) 
The quantity 
*
,, titi φφ −  (5) 
explains the impact of fiscal policy on the synchronisation level between the union-wide and 
country i  business cycles. The research question this paper examines is whether:  
Country’s i  fiscal policy does affect the level of business cycle synchronisation with 
the monetary union-wide cycle, or 0*,, ≠− titi φφ . 
Arguably, the relationship between country i  and the union wide cycle varies across 
time and, thus, the effects of fiscal policy on business cycle synchronisation is also expected to 
be time varying. Hence, this framework captures the dynamic behavior of fiscal authorities. 
 
4. Data Description 
 The dataset includes annual3 GDP and Cyclically Adjusted Net Lending (NLB)4 data 
from 105 EMU member-countries and the aggregate EMU12 (EMU12 core members: Austria, 
Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Netherlands; EMU12 periphery members: Greece, 
Ireland, Italy and Portugal). The data cover the period from 1980 to 20126. All GDP prices are 
expressed in logarithms; they are seasonally adjusted and refer to constant levels. The 
Cyclically Adjusted Net Lending data have been converted into percentages of GDP. The data 
are retrieved from the Annual Macro-Economic database, AMECO®, of the European 
Commission and Datastream®.  
 The EMU12 member-countries’ GDP data are used to extract a European wide business 
cycle. This is the average cycle at which the common monetary policy is assumed to be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 The use of annual data is mainly influenced by the use of fiscal variables. Fiscal data on annual basis are 
calculated on an accrual based approach, whereas in quarterly frequency the fiscal estimates are calculated on 
cash based approach (thus not appropriately measured). Furthermore, quarterly net lending data were not available 
for the full sample period for all countries. In addition, the estimated output (not shown here but available upon 
request) provided evidence that the quarterly data are not useful for policy implication, because of the cash-based 
nature of variables.  	   
4 The net lending/borrowing is largely determined by the business cycle and therefore highly endogenous. Thus, 
the use of the cyclically adjusted net lending addresses the issue of endogeneity in our model. 
5 The EMU12 business cycle is estimated in the same spirit with Artis et al. (2004). Spain and Luxembourg have 
been omitted from the analysis due to the lack of availability of cyclically adjusted net lending for the full period. 
Nevertheless, we incorporated the Spanish GDP for the calculation of the EMU12 business cycle.	  
6 For Greece the data cover the period 1988 to 2012, whereas for Ireland the data cover the period 1985 to 2012.  
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responsive to. Although since its inception EMU has increased to 17 member countries we 
retain our focus on the original members. Cyclically adjusted net lending data is used to assess 
the effects of discretionary fiscal policy, in each of the sample countries, on their individual 
economies business cycle synchronisation with the aggregate EMU12 cycle. 
 The cyclical components of the log-GDP series are extracted with the Hodrick and 
Prescott (1997) filter. Additional filtering methods have also been used (Baxter and King, 1999 
filter and Christiano and Fitzgerald, 2003 band pass filter) for robustness purposes and in order 
to allow to the results to be comparable with the existing literature. The results are qualitatively 
similar. 
 To estimate the cyclical component, using the Hodrick and Prescott (HP) filter, we 
assume that the seasonally adjusted log-GDP series, y , is composed by a trend, τ ,	  and a 
cyclical component, c , such that: 
ttt cy +=τ . (6) 
 The cyclical component can be found by deducting the trend component from the actual 
series, assuming that irregular movements of the GDP series are zero. Thus, it is maintained 
that the cyclical variations represent deviations from the estimated long run trend of the series. 
In order to filter the trend component so that we then deduct it from the actual series, we need 
an appropriate smoothing parameter λ , that minimizes: 
( ) ( )[ ]∑ ∑
=
−
=
−+ −−−+
T
t
T
t
tttttc
1
1
2
2
11
2 ττττλ .
 
(7) 
The first part of equation above penalizes for poor fit (i.e. large residuals), whereas the second 
term penalizes variability in the trend component’s growth rate. The choice of the smoothing 
parameter λ  influences the output of the cyclical component. If λ  acquires large values then 
the greater the penalty and, thus, the smoother the estimated trend will be.  On the other hand 
a low value of λ  will produce a more volatile estimated trend7.  
 
 
 
 
5. Estimating the Effects of Fiscal Policy on the Dynamic Correlation  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  Hodrick and Prescott (1997) suggest that for monthly, quarterly and annual data the appropriate smoothing 
parameter should take the value 14400, 1600 and 100, respectively.	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 This section describes the method used to estimate the effects of fiscal policy on 
business cycle synchronisation, over time. Once we isolate the cyclical component of the GDP 
series, we adopt the following procedure, which is comprised of three steps: 
Step 1: Define an estimate of the correlation between the business cycles of the 11 EU countries 
and the aggregate EMU12 cycle. 
 The research question stated in Section 2 requires the estimation of time varying ti,φ  
and *,tiφ  quantities. An appropriate measure of the quantities ti,φ  and 
*
,tiφ  is the correlation 
coefficient. If a time-invariant relationship between country i  and the union wide cycle had 
been considered, then the level of synchronisation would have been iφ . In such a case, the 
impact of fiscal policy on the synchronisation level between the union-wide and country i  
business cycles would be *ii φφ − . The iφ  and 
*
iφ could be estimated from titiitMU cc ,,, εφ +=  
and  
( ) tiktiitiitMU xcc ,,1,,*, εβφ +−= − , (8) 
respectively.  
Considering the dynamic behavior of business cycles and fiscal policies, such time-
invariant estimates could not provide policy information. Requiring the correlation coefficients 
to vary over time, we propose the estimation of ti,φ  and 
*
,tiφ  as the time-varying correlation 
coefficients obtained by a multivariate dynamic auto-correlated and cross-correlated 
framework illustrated as (introduced by Bollerslev et al., 1988): 
( )
( ),,...,,...,,
,,;~
2121
2/1
−−−−=
=
ttttt
tt
ttt
vF
εεHHH
I0zz
zHc
σ  
(9) 
where the vector ⎟⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎝
⎛
=
t
ti
t c
c
,12
,c  refers to the bivariate stochastic process under investigation; i.e. 
the business cycles on an annual frequency. The tic , , for 11,...,1=i , denotes the business cycles 
of the 11 countries, whereas the tc ,12  denotes the business cycle of the aggregate EMU12.	   tz  
is a vector process with zero mean, ( ) 0z =tE , unit variance and zero covariance, ( ) Izz =ʹ′ttE . 
Its density function,	   ( )I0z ,,;vF t  is defined by a vector of parameters v . Additionally, ( ).σ  is 
a positive measurable function of the lagged conditional covariance matrices and the vector of 
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business cycles. The stationary property of the business cycle, as this has been extracted by the 
HP filter, justifies the estimation of the aforementioned framework.  
Framework (9) presents a generalized specification of multivariate ARCH model8. 
Similar approach has been adopted by Degiannakis et al. (2014) to investigate the correlation 
between the EU12 business cycle and the EU12 member-countries. The ith diagonal element of 
tH  expresses the dynamic variance of tic , , or 2,tiσ , whereas, the i,jth non-diagonal element of 
tH  expresses the dynamic covariance between tic ,  and  tjc , , or tji ,,σ . Hence, the time varying 
approximation of ti,φ  is, then, estimated as 
2
,12
2
,
,12,
,12,,
ˆ
tti
ti
titi
σσ
σ
ρφ =≡ . (10) 
In order to estimate framework (9), we utilize the Diag-BEKK 9  structure for the 
variance-covariance matrix tH , introduced by Engle and Kroner (1995), and the standard 
normal density function for the vector process tz . The Diag-BEKK with standard normal 
distribution is defined as: 
( )
,~~~~
,;~
1111111
2/1
0,12
0,
BHBAεεAAH
I0zz
zHc
0 ʹ′+ʹ′ʹ′+=
=⎟⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎝
⎛
−
−−− tttt
tt
tt
i
t
N
β
β
 
(11) 
where ( )ʹ′−≡ 0,120, ββitt cε  is the de-meaned tc , with a conditional covariance matrix 
denoting as tH . The Diag-BEKK specification defines a positive definite tH  matrix. The 
( )I0zz ,;~ tt N  is the bivariate standard normal density function. The 0,iβ  and 0,12β  coefficients 
denote the average value of the business cycle of the ith country and the business cycle of the 
aggregate EMU12, respectively.  
 The covariance matrix of the Diag-BEKK model is defined as: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  Technical details for the multivariate time-varying correlation models are available in Xekalaki and Degiannakis 
(2010, p.446). 
9The aim of this paper is to inform policy decision makers on the effects of fiscal policy on business cycle 
synchronisation. The use of annual data, which are flatter compared to those sampled on quarterly frequency, 
demand for models that can capture the full dynamics of the volatility and covariance estimates, such as the BEKK 
model. By contrast, if quarterly data could have been used then these data would require models that provide 
smoother volatility and covariance estimates, such as the RiskMetrics which is more parsimonious (see 
Degiannakis et al., 2014). 
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(12) 
 The time-varying correlation of the thi  country's business cycle and the aggregate 
EMU12 business cycle, ti ,12,ρ , which corresponds to the synchronisation quantity ti,φ , is 
estimated as: 
( )( )2 1,1222,22 1,1222,22,22 1,21,12 1,21,11,1
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(13) 
 The proposed structure of 1
~,AA0  and 1
~B , produces time-varying covariances 
(numerator of equation above). Otherwise (in case of constant covariance), a time-varying 
correlation due to the time-varying standard deviations would lead to an increase/decrease in 
synchronization in less/more volatile periods.   
Step 2: Define an estimate of the correlation between the business cycles of the 11 EU countries 
and the aggregate EMU12 cycle, which is not explained by the fiscal deficit. 
 The Diag-BEKK model specification is reformed in order to capture the effect of the 
current and/or previous years’ fiscal deficit to the current year's business cycle. Let the variable 
tix ,  refer to the fiscal deficit of ith country. Then, the term ktiiititi xc −−−= ,1,0,,, ββε  expresses 
the business cycle of ith country, at year t, that is not explained by the current and/or previous 
years’ fiscal deficit. The lags nk ,...,1,0=  incorporated into the model are selected according 
to the Schwarz (1978) Bayesian criterion. We model the contemporaneous, 0=k , and the 
lagged effects, 1≥k , of fiscal policy to business cycle as i) the fiscal policy has non-negligible 
effects in the very short term, ii) open governments tend to front load most of the impact to the 
first year, iii) governments that tend to have surprising changes in fiscal policy have a greater 
weight on the second year impact.   
 The intention is to capture the time-varying correlation between business cycles of 11 
EU countries and the aggregate EMU12 business cycle which does not emanate from the fiscal 
deficit. The Diag-BEKK model framework is reformed as: 
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(14) 
 The time-varying correlation of the thi  country's business cycles and the aggregate 
EMU12 cycle which is not explained by the previous year's fiscal deficit, ∗ ti ,12,ρ , which 
corresponds to the synchronization quantity *,tiφ , is estimated as 
2
,12
2
,
,12,
,12,
tti
ti
ti
σσ
σ
ρ =∗  (15) 
from framework (14). 
Step 3: Estimate the impact of fiscal policy on the synchronisation of the business cycles.   
 The difference between the time-varying correlations ti ,12,ρ  and 
∗
ti ,12,ρ  explains the 
impact of lagged fiscal policy on the synchronisation of the thi country’s business cycle with 
the aggregate EMU12 business cycle. A positive difference indicates that country i’s lagged 
fiscal policy promotes greater synchronisation with the aggregate EMU12 business cycle, 
whereas the reverse applies for a negative difference. A zero difference implies that fiscal 
policy has not impacted on the business cycle synchronisation. 
 
6. Some business cycles and fiscal policy descriptive statistics 
Figure 1 presents the cyclical component of the business cycle for each EMU member-
country as well as for the EMU12 and Table 1 exhibits their descriptive statistics. The business 
cycle is presented as a percentage of each country’s own GDP to enable comparisons across 
different sized economies. 
[FIGURE 1 HERE] 
[TABLE 1 HERE] 
The business cycles are presented in terms of country groups for ease of exposition. All 
business cycles follow a similar pattern, nevertheless the EMU periphery countries seem to 
exhibit a more amplified variation. This is also evident by the standard deviation of these 
countries’ business cycles, as shown in Table 1. That is indicative of a core-periphery divide 
in business cycles, as established by Agresti and Mojon (2001), and Wynne and Koo (2000). 
Although, Italy is not considered a core country, its business cycle is similar to those of the 
	  14	  
	  
core EMU countries. Similarly, Finland’s business cycle also exhibits higher amplitude, which 
resembles the behaviour of the periphery’s business cycles. From Table 1 we also observe that 
cycles have a mean of almost zero, as expected. 
 Concerning the fiscal deficit, the descriptive statistics shown in Table 2 demonstrate 
that Greece, Portugal, Italy, and Belgium experience significantly higher deficits compared to 
the average EMU12 and those of the core EMU countries, such as Austria, Germany and 
Netherlands. It is interesting to note that Finland has on average a fiscal surplus. Furthermore, 
the high standard deviations of Belgium, Greece, Ireland and Italy imply a more active fiscal 
policy in these countries.  
In addition, Figure 2 informs us that fiscal policy has not been as responsive to business 
cycle fluctuations (as a countercyclical fiscal policy might suggest it ought to be) as the 
constantly negative values imply a fiscal deficit bias. The pattern of fiscal deficit is also 
observed in the core EMU countries. Overall, during the period under examination, fiscal 
policy has been in deficit as shown in the aggregate EMU12 data, which is in line with the 
well-known deficit bias in fiscal policy of Tabellini and Alesina (1990) and Persson and 
Svensson (1989).  
 [FIGURE 2 HERE] 
[TABLE 2 HERE] 
The observed deficit is gradually reduced during the run-up to EMU which is indicative 
of the adjustments these countries made to fiscal policy prior to EMU membership.  
Turning our attention to the time-varying synchronisation, we can observe the 
following empirical regularities (see Figure 3). First, the synchronisation level is fairly high on 
average during most of the period of this study for all member countries. Second, Ireland and 
Germany are the only two countries that exhibit any negative correlation with the EMU-wide 
cycle. Third, since the inception of the common currency, we observe that there is an increase 
in the synchronisation level, although this is more apparent for the core EMU countries. Forth, 
since the onset of the European Debt crisis in 2010 we observe a divergence in the level of 
synchronisation among the member-countries and the EMU-wide cycle. More importantly, de-
synchronisation is observed between the German business cycle and that of the EMU-wide 
cycle.           
[FIGURE 3 HERE] 
Having examined the countries’ business cycles, fiscal policy stances and their 
synchronisation level with the aggregate EMU-wide cycle, we further the analysis to the impact 
of fiscal policy on business cycle synchronisation. 
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7. The Time-varying Effects of Fiscal Policy on Business Cycle Synchronisation 
Indicatively, Tables 3 and 4 present the estimated parameters of the Diag-BEKK(1,1) 
model for France and Italy, respectively10. Table 5 and Figure 4 present the effect of fiscal 
policy on business cycle synchronisation for the 10 EMU sample countries, as expressed from 
the difference between the estimates ti ,12,ρ  and 
∗
ti ,12,ρ . The 
( )∗− titi ,12,,12, ρρ  (16) 
quantifies the impact of fiscal policy on the synchronisation of the thi country’s cycle with the 
aggregate EMU12-wide cycle. The analysis of the impact of fiscal policy on determining 
business cycle synchronisation reveals some interesting results.  
[TABLE 3 HERE] 
[TABLE 4 HERE] 
From Table 5, we observe that fiscal policy over the whole sample period has on 
average a positive effect on the level of synchronisation in many countries, although this does 
not hold true for France, Germany, Netherlands and Portugal.  
[TABLE 5 HERE] 
This is a positive finding for the Eurozone, showing that on average fiscal policy 
operates to support the synchronisation of business cycles. However, in nearly all cases the 
average figure is below 10% and it is much lower in some countries. This could be suggestive 
of the fact that fiscal policy may not be a very important determinant of business cycle 
synchronisation for most countries. There are two points that need to be raised, though. First, 
the standard deviations reveal that for most countries the effect of fiscal policy is not stable 
over the sample period but it is rather volatile. Second, the values on Table 5 do not allow for 
the time-varying impact of fiscal policy on business cycle synchronisation. Thus, the full 
picture of the effects of fiscal policy can be revealed by a time-varying approach, as illustrated 
in Figure 4.  
[FIGURE 4 HERE] 
Contrary to the static character of the average effects of fiscal policy on business cycle 
synchronization which were reported in Table 5, the panels in Figure 4 actually suggest that 
fiscal policy does have an economically important effect on business cycle synchronisation for 
nearly all countries. Even more, for some countries, such as Finland, Germany, Greece, Italy, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 For the sake of brevity, Diag-BEKK estimates for the remaining countries are not shown here but they are 
available upon request. The variance covariance matrix has been estimated using the robust quasi-maximum 
likelihood method of Bollerslev and Wooldridge (1992). 
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Ireland and Portugal, fiscal policy has a substantial effect, changing the synchronisation 
measure by more than 65%. On the contrary, the impact in Austria and Belgium is much less 
sizable.   
Nonetheless, the importance of fiscal policy on determining synchronisation is not the 
full story emerging from the results. The findings indicate that the impact of fiscal policy is 
country specific, as well as, time-varying. This is consistent with the findings of Candelon et 
al. (2010), who find country specific impacts of fiscal policy. With regards to the variation of 
the impact of fiscal policy over time, the switch in the sign of ∗− titi ,12,,12, ρρ  shows the change 
from positive to negative influences across time. There are periods that fiscal policy promotes 
business cycle synchronisation (the line fluctuates in the positive region), whereas at other 
times, fiscal policy has the opposite effect. These abrupt and irregular changes across time 
enhance the motivation for the estimation of the time-varying measure of the effects of fiscal 
policy on business cycle synchronisation.  
We further our analysis by focusing on the effects of fiscal policy on business cycle 
synchronisation during both recessionary and non-recessionary periods. Heterogeneous 
behavior is observed across the countries and the different time periods. Overall, no discernable 
difference is apparent in the impact of fiscal policy on business cycle synchronisation during 
recessionary and non-recessionary periods.  For example, during the ongoing European Debt 
crisis (a common shock with asymmetric responses), fiscal policy had a positive impact on 
synchronisation in many countries, such as Finland, Ireland or Italy, where the difference 
between ti ,12,ρ  and
∗
ti ,12,ρ  fluctuated around the 20% level, although it reached the level of 80% 
in the case of Finland. On the other hand, in the cases of Greece, Germany and the Netherlands, 
fiscal policy had a detrimental effect on business cycle synchronisation, although this is 
especially evident in the case of Greece (the difference between ti ,12,ρ  and
∗
ti ,12,ρ was more than 
40%). Yet, for Austria or Belgium fiscal policy did not really have any effect on 
synchronisation. Similar heterogeneous observations can be also made for other European 
recessionary periods. 
The lack of use of fiscal policy to consistently promote business cycle synchronisation 
possibly may be due to the fact that the domestic fiscal policy stance is not explicitly targeting 
business cycle synchronisation. In addition, domestic fiscal policy may be influenced by 
politically motivated choices, which may not necessarily lead to greater synchronisation. 
Nevertheless, while policy makers may not be expected to use fiscal policy to promote business 
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cycle synchronisation, the goal of macroeconomic stabilisation in a monetary union suggests 
that it ought to play such a role in response to asymmetric shocks.  
However, evidence of fiscal policy behaviour consistently supporting business cycle 
synchronisation is not provided by the present study. The empirical effects of fiscal policy 
identified here suggest that fiscal policy could play such a role. As such fiscal policy could be 
useful in mitigating the costs of EMU membership when structural differences or asymmetries 
between economies are more prevalent. 
Additionally, we cannot observe any discernible difference in the role of fiscal policy 
in determining business cycle synchronisation, either in the pre or post EMU period or between 
the core and peripheral EMU countries.  
Overall, we find evidence that none of the countries under examination consistently 
uses fiscal policy to promote business cycle synchronisation, as macroeconomic theory 
suggests it ought to in a monetary union. 
 
8. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
A successful currency union is facilitated when its member-states have synchronised 
business cycles. A number of determinants of business cycle synchronisation have been 
identified by the literature (see, among others, Cerqueira and Martins, 2011; Kose et al., 2008; 
Imbs, 2004, 2006; Morgan et al., 2004; Kose et al., 2003a, 2003b; Frankel and Rose, 1998; 
Canova and Dellas, 1993), nevertheless, the existing empirical work provides scarce evidence 
regarding the impact of fiscal policy on business cycle synchronisation. Thus, this paper 
investigates the effects of individual countries’ fiscal policy on the time-varying business cycle 
synchronisation between the initial EMU12 member-countries and the aggregate EMU12 
business cycle. The study uses annual GDP and cyclically adjusted Net Lending -	  data from 11 
EMU member-countries and the aggregate EMU12. The sample period runs from 1980 to 2012.   
We maintain that understanding the potential effects of fiscal policy in determining 
business cycle synchronisation in the EMU is an important and timely question. This is justified 
by the fact that since the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-09 and the ongoing Eurozone debt 
crisis, the economic debate revolves around fiscal consolidation and its impact on economic 
activity, and thus on business cycles.  
Results show that fiscal policy is an important determinant of business cycle 
synchronisation across all EMU12 member-countries. For a number of countries, such as 
Finland, Germany, Greece, Italy, Ireland and Portugal, the magnitude of the fiscal policy 
effects are greater, whereas the impact in Austria and Belgium is considerably smaller.  
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Furthermore, the evidence suggests that fiscal policy effects vary both across time and across 
countries. However, we cannot provide evidence that the importance of fiscal policy in 
determining business cycle synchronisation differs either in the pre or post EMU period or 
between the core and peripheral EMU countries.  
Finally, we must emphasise that according to our findings, fiscal policy could influence 
business cycle synchronisation in a way that is conducive to the operation of the single currency 
area. However, there is no evidence that fiscal policy has consistently been used in such a way 
throughout our sample period. Even more, the empirical results show that the use of fiscal 
policy could lead to de-synchronisation of the business cycles. Nevertheless the institutional 
response in the Eurozone, as exemplified most recently by the Fiscal compact, focuses on 
curtailing the buildup of debt and limiting the fiscal deficit (in order to promote convergence 
and sustainability in public finances), despite the fact that the restrictions they impose could 
limit the stabilising role that fiscal policy could potentially play in EMU. 
The policy implication of the aforementioned results is that fiscal stance is a useful 
stabilisation tool in a monetary union and the design of fiscal constraints should allow for fiscal 
policy to perform this role when necessary, while also constraining idiosyncratic policy 
induced de-synchronisation. In the presence of such constraints, a union-wide borrowing 
facility would be useful to countries to stabilise asymmetric shocks when domestic fiscal 
constraints are reached, as in the current EMU debt crisis. Alternatively, other systems of fiscal 
transfer across EMU would be necessary to ensure stability. The aforementioned policy 
implications are complementary to Colciago et al. (2008) who suggest that fiscal constraints 
should focus on the control of aggregate EMU debt and the pursuit of policies that are 
symmetrical over the cycle. 
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Figures 
Figure 1. Business cycles ( tic , ) of the EMU member-countries and the aggregate EMU12. 
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Figure 2. Cyclically Adjusted Fiscal Deficits as a percentage of GDP; titi GDPx ,,  of the EMU member-
countries.	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Figure 3. Time varying business cycle synchronisation between the EMU member-countries and the 
EMU12-wide business cycle (the line graphs plot the time-varying correlations ti ,12,ρ ).	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Figure 4. The impact of the cyclically adjusted fiscal deficit on the time varying business cycle 
synchronisation between the EMU member-countries and the EMU12-wide business cycle (the line graphs 
plot the percentage difference between the time-varying correlations ti ,12,ρ  and
∗
ti ,12,ρ  across time). The grey 
area surrounding the line plots the 95% confidence interval.	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Committee. 
	  
	  
	  26	  
	  
Tables 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the business cycles for the EMU 
member-countries and the aggregate EMU12. 
Country Mean Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. 
Austria 0.0001 3.6048 -2.7247 1.6201 
Belgium 0.0002 3.1863 -2.1024 1.4502 
Finland 0.0008 11.4895 -8.5633 4.7336 
France 0.0001 3.7423 -7.7335 2.5317 
Germany 0.0003 6.5334 -6.9896 3.2089 
Greece 0.0003 8.8943 -15.0973 4.5252 
Ireland 0.0006 13.2649 -11.3363 6.4189 
Italy 0.0004 3.8634 -9.3371 2.6915 
Netherlands 0.0007 4.7608 -4.2564 2.0534 
Portugal 0.0002 7.3054 -6.6771 3.4074 
EMU12 0.0001 4.1723 -2.6531 1.8640 
	  
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of cyclically adjusted fiscal deficits 
(percentage of GDP) for the EMU member-countries. 
Country Mean Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. 
Austria -2.8219 -0.2971 -5.4630 1.1613 
Belgium -5.2260 0.5722 -15.6908 4.3146 
Finland 1.3316 5.8184 -3.6389 2.5922 
France -3.4010 -0.6332 -6.3373 1.4267 
Germany -2.3747 0.4499 -9.6104 1.9095 
Greece -8.6851 -2.3438 -19.0856 4.1637 
Ireland -3.8353 3.0329 -28.2719 6.5072 
Italy -6.8531 -1.1804 -12.3374 3.7717 
Netherlands -3.0719 0.5956 -8.3844 2.0655 
Portugal -5.5969 -3.1612 -10.4832 1.9889 
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Table 3. Estimated parameters of the Diag-BEKK(1,1) model for France. The coefficient 
to standard error ratios are reported in brackets. 
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Table 4. Estimated parameters of the Diag-BEKK(1,1) model for Italy. The coefficient to 
standard error ratios are reported in brackets. 
Without the Fiscal Policy Variable 
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With the Cyclically Adjusted Fiscal Policy Variable 
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Table 5. Descriptive statistics of ( )∗− titi ,12,,12, ρρ ; the percentage impact of 
the cyclically adjusted fiscal deficit on the time varying business cycle 
synchronization. 
Country Mean Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. 
Austria 0.5426 25.2452 -21.1027 9.8239 
Belgium 1.4036 21.1531 -3.8198 5.7992 
Finland 9.9194 68.1599 -68.7512 30.4105 
France -3.5220 30.0601 -36.5187 14.6396 
Germany -2.3565 87.1816 -55.4394 24.5987 
Greece 9.9220 151.1152 -46.6216 40.4158 
Ireland 0.6481 65.2331 -39.6497 22.3510 
Italy 11.1891 95.3999 -37.1065 28.1504 
Netherlands -0.8652 33.9655 -42.1086 16.4292 
Portugal -8.8455 28.7667 -77.2819 22.6602 
 
